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Abstract: This paper tries to offer an indication of what it means to be young, displaced and 
looking for a job in a war-affected town of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Starting off as 
a sociological survey into the livelihoods of young displaced migrants in the city of Butembo, 
it subsequently integrates more critical views on the life making perspectives of these African 
youngsters, who appear to be affected as much by problems of daily survival as by a lack of 
access to decent jobs. The high entry gates these youngsters face in their quest for a decent 
living not only illustrates the explicitly political  nature of Butembo’s job market in the 
aftermath of war, but also supports the claim that stories of daily survival and political 
categorization/marginalization remain inherently connected. The fact that this connection is 
often explicitly made in these youngsters’ imagination about a better life forces us to rethink 
critically the relationship between armed violence, livelihoods and economic markets in the 
aftermath of protracted conflicts. 
                                                 
1 This paper came about with the help and dedication of many people. I would like to thank my Congolese research team, 
under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Meni Malikwisha, for their excellent work and support. I would also like to thank my 
Master’s students Lennart Vandamme and Lies Sacré for their comparative insights and fruitful discussions on the subject. I 
also gained much insight and understanding from a panel organized at the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies 
on the ‘navigation’ of African urban spaces (organized by Mats Utas and Henrik Vigh) in June 2009. Last but not least I 




This working paper documents the life-making perspectives of displaced Congolese 
youngsters in the town of Butembo, close to the Ugandan border. Although it partly builds on 
long-term ethnographic research in the area during 2003-2008, the actual work for this paper 
originally involved a classic sociological survey analysing the access of these youngsters to 
so-called “informal” urban jobs. Although different definitions still prevail about such 
“informal” occupations (see amongst others Hart, 1973; MacGaffey, 1991), they make up an 
important part of the urban labour market during and in the aftermath of war. A more indepth 
study appeared relevant both for analytical and practical reasons. Fieldwork, which was 
carried out in September-October 2008, consisted of a survey of 348 interviews (190 male and 
158 female IDPs) divided more or less equally between the city of Butembo and its urban 
periphery, as well as some focus group discussions
2. Building on earlier work on economic 
markets in (post-) conflict regions, this study specifically concentrated on the capacities, 
attitudes and practices of what are commonly seen as passive victims of protracted armed 
conflict: unarmed displaced youngsters that had been escaping recurrent violence in their 
home regions. Besides wanting to avoid common stereotypes
3, the reason for this deliberate 
choice lays in the hypothesis that the potential violent “eruption” of unemployed youth in the 
aftermath of war should be situated at least in part in their condition of hyper mobility – i.e. 
the inability to forge stable attachments. In their leading study on the Mano River region in 
West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast), Richards and Chauveau describe hyper 
mobility as “the inability to settle and forge stable attachments professionally and socially in 
either rural or urban settings.” On the same page, they suggest that “hyper-mobile 
impoverished rural youth are not a sufficient cause of armed conflict, but their availability for 
                                                 
2 The interviewed youth were all between 15-36 years (although 85% of them fluctuated between the age of 18-26). Data for 
this survey was gathered in Butembo and Bunyuka (a rural periphery) following a focused sampling method – i.e. with 
questions focusing on main informal occupations and their representative associations in the commercial and transport sector, 
and processed through SPSS software methods. The participants for focus group discussions (four in total) were contacted 
both ad random and through diaspora associations indicated by the city’s social council. 
3 The idea that unemployed youth – particularly young men – are inclined to join a rebel movement still sounds particularly 
attractive as a conflict indicator in African contexts, especially when attached to ruling notions of “social madness” in 
African cities (Shoumatoff, 1988). Protagonists of this analysis have been World Bank consultants Anke Hoeffler and Paul 
Collier (1999; 2001), who in their analysis of factors pertaining to civil war outbreaks in 1960-1999 used male secondary 
school endowment and income opportunities as a proxy of conflict risk (or rather, the opportunity for armed rebellion). In his 
paper ‘Doing Well out of War’, Collier (1999: 3) concludes that “if young men face only the option of poverty they might be 
more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities.”  
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recruitment when other employment opportunities fail is a major factor in fuelling insurgency 
in all three countries. Cutting off the supply of recruits to militia factions by providing more 
suitable employment opportunities attractive to these young people would contribute to peace 
and stability in West Africa.” (Richards and Chauveau, 2007: 7) Besides the material benefits 
of employment, it is evident that this ability to construct stable attachments also heavily 
depends on the successful project of actively “making a life” (Åkesson, 2004: 22). As has 
been observed in other contexts, such projects are not only intimately connected to local 
perspectives on material opportunities and associations but are undoubtedly also inspired by 
more social and cultural aspirations to a better life away from harm and causes of 
impoverishment. Given the current urge with which the global aid community addresses the 
issue of youth and conflict risk in post-conflict settings, it is surprising how little is known 
about the exact conditions youth face in post-war labour markets. A recent report by the 
World Bank on youth and employment in Africa, for example, observes that: 
 
“Post-conflict settings pose specific challenges for the youth (e.g., recently disarmed idle 
men and displaced young men) as these settings have prominently young populations, 
many of whom have been deprived of education, have grown up in violent societies, and 
often have been combatants themselves. Employment and the creation of jobs for young 
people should therefore form a key component of any peace building processes.” (World 
Bank, 2009) 
 
Besides a few occasional studies in non-war contexts (De Waal and Argenti, 2002; Simone 
and Abouhani, 2005; Poluha, 2007, Bequele et al., 2008), the answer to such basic questions 
like what happens to youth after war
4; what is the (potential) impact of youth employment on 
conflict risk; and how these factors interrelate with urbanization are currently missing from 
the debate (Sommers, 2003, 2006).  
 
The city of Butembo appeared a particularly fruitful case for this analysis for several reasons. 
During the war, it served as a safe haven for displaced people coming both from the north (e.g. 
Ituri) and south (e.g. Lubero) without being as severely affected by the ongoing armed 
conflicts in these territories. While the level of registered IDP’s is relatively low (15.215, 
compared to 452.678 in Lubero and 26.925 in Beni at the time of the fieldwork), the town 
offered the opportunity to study displacement and forced migration outside the minority 
setting of displaced camp life (cf. infra). Displaced youth stands out as a particularly 
                                                 
4 For two excellent literature assessments, see Peters, Richards, and Vlassenroot (2003) and Sommers (2006).  
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problematic category within this mobile population for the reasons outlined above. A second 
reason constitutes the organization of the urban labour market, which could be described as a 
commercial oligopoly. The town’s import and export trade is channelled through a closed 
network of about 8 to ten family businesses locally referred to as the G8 (Raeymaekers, 2010). 
Whereas some of these businesses have a vested interest in the war economy (i.e. export of 
minerals and gold, and occasionally arms imports), their particular organization around family 
and kin makes it difficult for outsiders to obtain secure labour. In addition, the almost 
complete lack of industrialization has forced most inhabitants to seek for employment in so-
called informal jobs in order to sustain their livelihoods (see also Raeymaekers, 2007; 
Mirembe, 2002).  
 
During fieldwork, some important limits were discovered to the livelihood analysis of these 
displaced youngsters. Particular problems arose in disentangling the inherently political 
nature of Butembo’s labour market and its impact on the access of young displaced people to 
informal jobs. More specifically, the analysis was confronted with a need to develop more 
adequate instruments to answer why and how urban informal jobs did not present themselves 
as they theoretically should in this post-conflict environment, as social and economic safety 
nets for the poor (Cooper, 2002; Goodhand, 2004). The lack of access of these young IDPs to 
sustainable livelihoods, which clearly showed in individual interviews and during focus group 
discussions, seemed neither to be determined by commonly evoked deficiencies in individual 
‘social capital’, but on the contrary by a particular model of local market organization. Instead 
of opening a multitude of “spaces of opportunity” in the aftermath of war (Simone and 
Abouhani, 2005: 24), youngsters often faced incredible difficulties to gain access to decent 
jobs and as a consequence continue to live a life in marginality and despair. This paper tries to 
answer why this is the case. 
 
In order to document the relationships of immigrant youngsters with the local labour market, 
this working paper will take the following steps. First, a short introduction will be provided to 
the recent history of the Democratic Republic of Congo and its experience of war-to-peace 
“transition”. After having laid out the general conditions displaced people (and youth in 
particular) face in the eastern parts of the country in these current times of crisis, it will say a 
few words about the organization of Butembo’s labour market, where the focus of the present 
research is situated. The final part of this paper contains two biographical case studies of a 
combatant and non-combatant youngster in Butembo’s urban labour market which try to  
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illustrate the observed relationships between livelihood chances, economic markets and local 
violence from an emic, ethnographic viewpoint.   
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo from war to peace - and back again 
 
The town of Butembo is situated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country in 
Central Africa that has experienced over a decade of armed conflict. Its 6 to 700.000 
inhabitants are almost exclusively from Nande origin, a population that lives predominantly in 
the area stretching from the Lubero forest up to the Uganda border, which is locally referred 
to as Bunande. The area includes the territories of Beni and Lubero, situated in the northern 
part of North Kivu. Over the last twenty years, the area has been repeatedly plagued by armed 
conflict, starting with the first Congo war (1996-1997) that brought Laurent-Désiré Kabila to 
power in the capital of the DRC Kinshasa, to the more recent gulf of targeted assassinations 
and army abuse commented in local media
5.  
 
Specialist scholars maintain that the heart of the ongoing political crisis is a merger of local, 
national and regional dynamics of conflict (Vlassenroot, 2002; Reyntjens and Marysse, 2005). 
Particularly from the early 1990s, the progressive atrophy of Zaire’s neo-patrimonial rule and 
of its dictatorial leader Joseph-Désiré Mobutu provoked an intensive national political 
competition, which instigated a local struggle for land and political representation. In the 
province of North Kivu, this growing competition soon acquired an ethnic character as 
“autochthonous” chiefs from Hunde and Nyanga decent increasingly incited their subject 
communities to enact a violent expulsion of their “immigrant” Rwandan-speaking neighbours, 
some of whom had lived there for over a hundred years. This conflict between Rwandan-
speaking immigrants (Banyarwanda) from Hutu and Tutsi origin, Hunde, and to a lesser 
extent also Nande populations already led to violent outbursts in Masisi in 1993, killing 
several thousand people. Over the next years, this local conflict would soon acquire a regional 
character as in 1994, over a million Rwandan Hutu refugees settled in eastern Zaire as a 
consequence of the Rwandan genocide. From the refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu (the 
capitals of North and South Kivu), Hutu extremist militia known as Interahamwe organized 
repeated incursions into Rwandan territory. It now appears from UN documents that Rwandan 
                                                 
5 Civil society organizations have reported the death of more than 30 people in September 2010 in Beni territory alone. These 
killings are widely commented in the local press (see for example www.benilubero.com/).  
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soldiers organized military campaigns deep into Congolese territory to take revenge against 
the local Hutu population. The strongest reaction from Rwanda at the time came nonetheless 
in the creation of a new “liberation” force which united neighbouring countries like Uganda 
and Burundi and disgruntled Congolese rebels in a joint struggle against Mobutu’s dying 
regime. Headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) reached Kinshasa in May 1997 followed by a flock of 
‘kadogo’ (child soldiers) from Kivu and other adjacent regions. Whereas Kabila was heralded 
both nationally and internationally as the prophet of a democracy – he immediately renamed 
the name of the country to DRC – his authoritarian threads and pursuit of an increasingly 
“autochthonous” Congolese agenda soon made him follow the footsteps of his predecessors 
Mobutu and other African dictators. Only one year after his arrival in Kinshasa, a growing 
disagreement with his foreign supporters (Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda) instigated the 
formation of a new rebel movement sustained by the same powers that had originally 
supported Kabila’s alliance. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which was founded 
in Goma in August 1998 by collection of frustrated intellectuals and political leaders a – 
including former Kabila and Mobutu cronies, set in motion a full-fledged regional conflict 
that would only be marginally affected by several peace agreements from 1999 onwards. 
Despite the imposition of a (albeit initially modest) UN peacekeeping mission
6, the armed 
struggle between the RCD, the national government and a series of state and non-state armed 
parties would lead to a steady fragmentation of the country’s national territory in various rebel 
strongholds linked to different foreign markets and supporters.  
 
It was not until July 2003 when an all-inclusive agreement would be signed between 
Congolese belligerents (excluding foreign supporters), that it became possible to envisage 
something similar to a “post” - conflict. But even then, it remained difficult to catchphrase the 
evolution of the DRC’s as being different from outright regional war. What one observes 
since the late 1990s in the Africa’s vast Great Lakes region is instead a rapid regionalization 
of local conflict agendas with important transnational and even global connections (Callaghy, 
Kassimir and Latham, 2001). This has made it increasingly necessary to analyze and 
document not only the role of regional and transnational forces shaping current conflicts, but 
also to address the question of how orders and authorities shaping social existence at a local 
                                                 
6 The UN Mission in Congo, known under its acronym MONUC, steadily grew from less than 6.000 to close to 20.000 
military troops, excluding observers, police and civilian components.  
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level form and operate at specific sites and across multiple territories. According to Chris 
Cramer: “there is an argument that contemporary wars are the product of a shift in the world 
economy in recent decades: where once the world economy was expansive and inclusionary, 
it has contracted and become exclusionary.” But, as he says, something the opposite is true: 
“the integration of developing countries into the world economy is central to an understanding 
of violence and war; and (…) development transition (…), which is itself conflictual and 
typically violent, often takes on a particular intensity by dint of this integration.” (Cramer, 
2006: 238) This is at least part of the reason why it remains useful in the DRC to talk about a 
network war (Duffield, 2001), because it continues to produce its violent outcomes in terms of 
changing sovereignties, extraversion of internal political agendas and a continuous re-
territorialisation of political claims along regional complexes of power and authority (for 
detailed examples, see Raeymaekers, 2002: Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004; Veit, 2010).  
 
Keeping in mind this persistent fragmentation and re-territorialisation of the Congolese 
conflict, it has not been easy for external stabilisation forces to accompany the country’s post-
war “transition”. Particularly since 2003, the UN peace mission in the DRC, MONUC, found 
itself trapped in an awkward position, where it was supposed to “stabilize” insecurity and 
integrate warring parties into a new security framework. In practice, however, it often found 
itself operating side by side to an abusive security apparatus that used this external cover to 
support claims of territorial sovereignty and sustain violent modes of predation. In the 
meantime, challenges have come from a national level, too. More recently, Congolese 
President Kabila and his government actively pressurized the UN Mission in Congo to trim 
down operational capacities and plan an exit strategy “as soon as possible”, saying the army is 
perfectly suitable to monitor the security situation alone. These growing pressures are a 
reflection of a changing government policy in DRC after the 2006-2007 elections, in which an 
increasingly confident Kabila (who won with 58 percent in the second round and has a 
comfortable majority in parliament) is accusing the international community of intermingling 
in national affairs. Partly in response this government critique, in June 2010, the UN Security 
Council decided to change strategy and transform MONUC into a stabilization force with up 
to 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members 
of formed police units. In theory, the arrival of MONUSCO (United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) could constitute an 
opportunity to change the situation for the better as its main priority is the protection of 
civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of  
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physical violence. In practice, however, the UN and Congolese stakeholders have quietly been 
looking for an exit strategy prior to the 2011 regional elections
7. This tendency has already 
produced an evident result in the planned withdrawal of up to 2,000 United Nations military 
personnel by 30 June 2010, which directly corresponds to Kabila’s demands. MONUSCO 
will theoretically be deployed until 30 June 2011, authorizing it to concentrate its military 
forces in the eastern DR Congo while keeping a reserve force capable of redeploying rapidly 
elsewhere (Security Council, 28 May 2010). 
 
The continuous “networked” character of the Congolese conflict has ultimately made it 
difficult to envisage a peace process that does not constantly have to swim against the tide. 
Since the all-inclusive power sharing agreement of July 2003, international donors have set up 
an ambitious state reconstruction programme, which theoretically includes a process of 
democratisation and decentralisation, a transition from relief to development aid and a gradual 
reintegration of former combatants and war-affected households into post-war society. In 
practice, however, this ideal has been disrupted by several challenges. For example the entire 
east of the country (including the provinces of North and South Kivu, Ituri, Maniema, and bits 
of Kasai and Katanga) still faces war-like levels of violence and poverty. Besides the 
structural inequalities and slave-like conditions which characterize the lives of this region’s 
mostly rural populations, this relentless violence also places serious doubts behind the current 
liberal peace paradigm, which ideologically defines peace as a necessary “public good”, and 
war as a “public bad” (Richards, 2005). Whereas stabilisation and development programmes 
usually are confined to a few hotbeds and urban centres, rural communities in eastern DRC 
remain subjected to the government of highly intricate networks of state and non-state actors 
who regulate the access to local services and resources through violent negotiation (Garrett et 
al., 2009). In these areas, where central state administration is usually a far cry, the state 
remains nevertheless highly present in localized “languages of stateness” (Hansen and 
Stepputat, 2005) expressed in kilometres of red tape and official bureaucratic documentation 
as well as in the physical presence of the state’s armed forces that add their fuel to the 
ongoing violence. Calling the army a peace spoiler in these rural and mining areas today is 
minimalistic if one considers the systematic extortion and rampant rape they continue to 
inflict on local populations. Recent studies into the challenges to the DRC’s democratisation 
                                                 
7 In 2011, both the DR Congo and Uganda will have legislative and presidential elections. Both Rwanda and Burundi already 
had elections in 2010, which were respectively won by Paul Kagame and Pierre Nkurunziza.  
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process evoke a number of reasons for this persistent predatory rule, including a failed 
planning of civilian protection by the government and UN forces as well as a staggering army 
integration (Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot, 2009). The most crucial problem, however, seems 
to be the “entrenched impunity” in which security operations and reform currently take place 
in the DR Congo, which can at least partly be related to the government’s failure to hold those 
responsible for war crimes and other violations responsible. Protagonists of previous war 
crimes, who until recently held elevated army positions, include amongst others Bosco 
Ntaganda, a war criminal on arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court, as well as 
other FARDC commanders. According to human rights watchdogs, there exists a direct 
connection between this entrenched impunity and the intensification of army abuse in the 
provinces of North and South Kivu, where the FARDC continues to lead operations against a 
number of non-state armed “spoilers”– most importantly Rwandan Hutu militias. Whereas the 
relationship between state and non-state human rights offenders in Kivu’s vastly occupied 
hinterland is complex to say the least, it is evident that beneath these recurrent instances of 
acute violence lay a number of structural conditions of (un)governability that will not simply 
disappear with elections or even government decentralisation. It is against this background 
that the lives of forcefully displaced youngsters presented in this study should be interpreted 
and analyzed. 
 
Youth and forced displacement 
 
Against this background of continuing protracted armed conflict in eastern DRC, the 
condition of unemployed displaced youth stands out as particularly problematic. Their 
situation adds up to an already appalling humanitarian environment, which can be related to 
an almost complete lack of education and health infrastructure as well as extremely high 
mortality, morbidity and malnutrition rates. These rates are even higher in regions affected by 
recurrent violence, due to lack of assistance by weak service providers as well as downgraded 
infrastructure
8.  
                                                 
8 Estimates of war victims in DRC are problematic and have come under increasing critique for their shallow empirical 
underpinnings (amongst others due inaccessible sites and lack of systematic follow-up). UNFPA numbers, which appear 
more or less reliable, estimated maternal mortality ratio at 549 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2007, infant mortality rates at 
115 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2005, and high childhood mortality  at 204 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2005. According 
to FAO data of the year 2000, only about 12 percent of eastern Congolese households could permit themselves three meals a 
day, 60 percent has two meals and 27 percent has only one meal a day (Vlassenroot, Raeymaekers and Ntububa, 2005).  
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Two problems stand out as particularly crucial. The first regards the extreme mobility with 
which assistance providers are faced, not only of internally displaced people (IDP’s) but of 
the rural population of eastern DRC in general. This makes it difficult to concentrate efforts in 
confined areas or camps. Of the 2.1 million IDP’s in eastern DR Congo, for example, only 
116,000 find refuge in UNHCR-run sites in the region, a total of 5 ½  percent (IRIN, 27 
January 2010). The majority of displaced people continue to find shelter in so-called 
“spontaneous sites” and (mostly in) host families, whose recipient capacity has nonetheless 
shown to be very limited. Ad hoc settlements, which include dilapidated buildings and 
improvised dwellings in forests, have been on the increase since recent fighting in the Masisi 
area in 2008
9 – bringing the total of (regular and spontaneous) camp dwellers to some 30-35 
percent of the total IDP population. Especially in urban areas, this excessive reliance on host 
families has created additional strains on already poverty-stricken households, whom now 
additionally have to engage in the assistance of vulnerable people like pregnant women and 
the elderly. It is not uncommon, therefore, to notice a certain level of discontent arising 
towards such “temporary guests”, which eventually ends with the expulsion of the displaced. 
Despite these rising problems, aid agencies continue to concentrate their efforts on camps, 
where they provide emergency assistance, transport and return packages to households that 
have sometimes been on the run for years
10.  
 
A related problem to such unregistered displacement is that in situations of protracted conflict, 
migration often becomes a cyclical phenomenon: each time a conflict settles down 
somewhere, a contamination effect ensues which forces people to flee in the opposite 
direction. As a result of this recurrent violence, many of eastern Congo’s actually live a life 
“in the limbo” (BBC World Service, 30 October 2009), pending between targeted home areas 
and adjacent fields as well as frequent (and often individual) dispersions because of armed 
violence that can erupt at any given moment. More broadly, such dispersed migration patterns 
should force us to ask more fundamental questions about the prospects of rural households to 
develop sustainable livelihoods during protracted conflict situations like the eastern DRC, 
which at some point should also touch on conceptions of what it means to be part of a 
                                                 
9 In May 2008 for example, Oxfam reported that recent fighting in North Kivu had given birth to some 20 new spontaneous 
sites, hosting at least 857,000 IDPs (IRIN, 28 May 2008).  
10 UNDP has recently even increased its effort in this regard as it aims to reach a further 125,000 IDPs in South Kivu through 
the UN social and economic recovery programme (IDMC website).  
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household, gain access to assets, generate a stable income and constitute a steady “home”. 
According to Anna Lindley, who has worked in a similar context of Somalia:  
 
“[T]o understand some violent conflict situations, and to design successful policies to 
prevent or respond, it is important to go beyond the macro-level, to explore the micro-
foundations – the individual, household and group interactions leading to and resulting 
from conflicts (…). This is perhaps particularly important in the context of protracted 
crises, where there are often complex and rather localised conflict dynamics.” (Lindley, 
2009: 4) 
 
Lindley’s call for more oblique approaches to phenomena of forced (post-)war displacement 
stand out as particularly attractive as it tends to start from the everyday realities and 
trajectories of people rather than privileging status and categorizations of forced migrants as 
the primary explanatory factor (see also: Bakewell, 2008). Specifically with regard to youth, 
the pervasiveness of leading categories
11  forces us to reach beyond dominant notions of 
victimcy and agency in a post-war environment. It has been observed that humanitarian 
interventions are generally guided by a rather exclusive understanding of children as passive 
victims of warfare without a proper agency. Such understandings are not only gender-
insensitive
12, they also risks reducing the study of youth distress to pure matters of victimcy 
according to distinct Western and Durkheimian perceptions (Eyber and Ager, 2004; Beneduce 
et al., 2006). This constitutes a major problem for understanding the life chances of displaced 
youngsters in post-war situations, as the main characteristic of youth in such “crisis” 
situations is indeed their straddling along different categories, often without belonging to 
either. In such situations, youth should indeed be understood above all as “a problematic, 
intermediary and ambivalent category, chiefly defined by what it is not: youths are not 
dependent children, but neither are they independent, socially responsible adults.” (de Waal, 
2002: 15; Sommers, 2006) This makes them particularly amenable to leading the life “in the 
limbo” that has by now become the dominant characteristic of rural populations in eastern 
DRC in general.  
                                                 
11 By way of example, UNICEF categorizes as “youth” people aged between 15 and 24; Safe the Children extends it to 13-25 
– while the UN distinguishes between child (0-18), adolescent (10-19) and adult (18 and older): Sommers (2006). 
12 In some cultures, female adulthood can occur at an early age, for example, while the status of “youth” is also determined 
by other factors such as (lack of) access to land, labour and family life – which are usually very different for male and female 
youngsters (Sommers 2002).  
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In order to cut through this ongoing debate on youth and protracted conflict, a decision had to 
be taken as to which specific age group this study would focus on. As a guiding indication, it 
took the age of 12-36 years as the fork to define who categorized as “youth” – mostly because 
this emerged from preliminary focus group discussions as the minimum and maximum age in 
which Butembo adolescents usually get married. Locally, marriage acts a major marker of 
adulthood for both genders (although subtle differences apply). It must be added that most 
interlocutors (85%) encountered during the survey varied between 18 and 26 years. This 
already gives an indication of the urbanization of these youngsters’ lifestyles, which continues 
to be laden with social and cultural meanings: contrary to their counterparts in more rural 
settings, young urban migrants seem to constitute a rather confined group of people that share 
a number of common (though fluid) traits. Before moving on to the ethnography of young 
lifestyles in Butembo, however, some indications will be given as to the migration motives 




A number of common characteristics can be observed between young displaced people in the 
city of Butembo and forced internal migrants in general. A general observation is that young 
IDP’s live scattered over the urban landscape, mostly with host families and very few in 
camps. At the time of the research, no such IDP camps were actually operative in Butembo – 
contrary to Beni and Lubero which continued to host flocks of IDP’s from Ituri and 
Walikale/West Lubero. It is clear that the large majority of these IDP’s originally left their 
homestead because of direct combat and security threats. Only one of the youngsters 
encountered for this study came from a non-rural context (i.e. the city of Bukavu), which 
confirms generally observed migration patterns from the countryside to the city in Africa
13.  
 
What makes youth different from other IDP’s in Butembo, however, is their weak capacity to 
develop what Paul Richards and Jean-Pierre Chauveau have called “stable attachments” (cf. 
supra). This incapacity already starts with their arrival in Butembo, which for close to half of 
the encountered youth constitutes an alien place in which they have no direct acquaintances: 
                                                 
13 It has been estimated that 60 percent of the world’s population will live in cities by 2030 and that as many as 60 percent of 
urban dwellers will be under the age of 18. Almost all of this growth will occur in developing world cities, especially in 
Africa.  
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while over half of (54 percent) initially directly went to look for family and kin, 43 percent 
came to Butembo “by accident”, just to find temporary relief from insecurity.  This data 
constitutes a major difference with the general information on IDP’s in North Kivu, which 
reports a total of 80 percent of IDPs being hosted by family and friends (UNICEF/CARE, 
2008: 7). While more profound research into this matter is surely warranted, this scattered 
arrival apparently confirms the unsettled status of Eastern Congo’s displaced youngsters in 
this urban context, who remain squeezed between their original rural homestead to which they 
cannot or do not want to return, and a new urban environment of which they share no prior 
material and social knowledge. Particularly the non-hosted IDP’s (which make up close to 
half of the total young IDP population) appear to be blocked in such unstable situations. 
According to one unemployed youngster interviewed during a group discussion: 
 
“Really, I live here by grace. It happens sometimes to meet with friends from back 
home. And then automatically, I ask [for money and food]. At that point, I survive.” 
(Interview, 21 September 2008) 
 
The statement by this young man from Mangina illustrates quite well how the lack of 
acquaintances of young migrants can easily translate in a lack of access to sustainable 
livelihood options in cases of unwarranted displacement. A notion of haphazardness 
introduces itself into the lives of these “unattached” youngsters, which can only partly be 
redeemed through occasional encounters with social peers (the young man was actually 
talking to members of a diaspora association of youth from Mangina that acts as a kind of 
self-help group). Still, the apparent “navigation” of these youngsters through accidental life 
opportunities in the social space of the city only constitutes a partial picture of young IDP 
livelihoods in the town of Butembo, as both hosted (i.e. those staying with host families) 
and non-hosted IDPs face enormous difficulties in making ends meet. Of the 54 percent of 
young displaced people that originally sought refuge with family and kin, just over one 
third exclusively receive accommodation (i.e. a bed for the night), while just about half of 
them also eats at their host’s place – mostly in return for a contribution in the form of 
money or small household labour. Only a very small minority of these hosted youngsters 
also finds assistance from their host parents for school fees (9 percent), medical care (7 
percent) and clothing (3 percent). As said, this tendency can be partly related to the limited 
capacities of urban host families, who are increasingly incapable of providing even a 
minimum of support to their unexpected guests (which has itself become a considerable  
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source of conflict). The material instability of internally displaced youngsters seems to 
express itself more accurately as a pending social situation characterized by a series of 
partial attachments to both the urban and rural environment, but none of which exactly 
figures as a stable “home”. This situation is illustrated for example in the testimony of a 
young girl from Mangina (who was talking at the same meeting) who continues to travel 
back and forth between Butembo and her rural background in the forest of Biakato. She 
arrived in Butembo in 2002 together with her mother and father, around the time when the 
forces of Jean-Pierre Bemba swept across north central Congo with a killing campaign 
code-named “Effacer le Tableau” (‘erasing the Board’)
14. From the moment they arrived in 
Butembo, however, her parents found it difficult to find a decent living so they left again 
for Biakato, leaving their daughter behind in her uncle’s house. While the girl keeps living 
with her uncle in town, she occasionally sends some money home to her parents via a 
friend or family member. But she finds the transfer difficult because her friend sometimes 
consumes the money during the trip. In addition, her host family is also limited in its 
capacities:  “What I see is that my uncle also has children, so I can not ask [for support] 
like them,” she said during our encounter at the centre (interview, 21 September 2008). So 
she continues doing little works in the household along with her daily labour of towing 
products from the surrounding fields towards the centre of town. 
 
The biographical examples from these two youngsters offer a first – albeit superficial – 
insight into the difficulties young displaced people face once they try to settle in an urban 
war-stricken environment. One of the first observations one can make on the basis of these 
testimonies regards the sheer inelasticity of the concept “host family”, which in the given 
context even acquires a hint of naivety. The concept appears to insufficiently capture the 
dispersed nature of Congolese households and their young displaced guests, as well as the 
modes in which the latter try to secure food and accommodation. A few extreme 
circumstances aside in which insecurity totally impedes a return to home regions (like for 
example the most remote parts of Walikale, in North-western Kivu) a more frequent mobility 
                                                 
14 This military campaign acquired serious indignation for the sheer brutality in which the Mouvement du Liberation du 
Congo (MLC) and its associated forces skimmed over Kivu’s countryside, leaving a trail of destruction and innocent victims 
in their tracks. In international media, ‘Effacer le Tableau’ quickly became emblematic for the barbarity of Congo’s war as it 
unfolded amongst others under allegations of cannibalism, for which the MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba eventually had to 
stand trial in the International Criminal Court. The brutality and almost carnavalesque manner in which this operation took 
shape – with commander nicknames such as ‘Le Roi des Imbéciles’ – caused a flow of refugees and internationally displaced 
people, mostly from the territory of Beni where the focal point of this campaign was situated.  
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pattern among displaced youngsters actually consists of circular migration between their 
original homesteads and new urban environments, in which the latter remains the main but 
never the exclusive place of residence. Displaced school attending youngsters, for example, 
frequently combine a more or less permanent residence in town during teaching semesters 
(with either family or acquired acquaintances) with brief but regular stays at their parents’ 
place during school holidays. Whereas their urban hosts usually ask for some kind of 
contribution to cover basic needs, school holidays serve as a period of saving and 
(occasionally) luxury spending – also to show off against fellow villagers that have not (yet) 
adopted their urban lifestyles. As one boy from Mangina explained, he uses his visits to the 
village to harvest and sell agricultural produce on the market, which enables him for example 
to buy a nice shirt with his savings (interview, 21 September 2008). The resulting solidarity 
pattern between these youngsters and their respective (host) parents can thus be described as a 
kind of give-and-take relationship in which support and food are shared sequentially (i.e. 
based on a particular time-space continuum) rather than being based on the immediate 
“despair” solidarity described by Trefon and others (Trefon, 2004, cf. infra). While this type 
of sequential solidarity requires some flexibility from the part of the youngsters’ “encadreurs” 
– for example teachers, who might have to wait months to be paid their weekly “minerval” or 
school fee – it does open up a modest time frame for them to jumpstart livelihood options and 
calculate existing risks. In some cases, their activities in town even permit them to provide in 
the livelihoods of relatives and friends. As several youngsters testified during focus group 
discussions, their “encadreurs” are generally tolerant towards delays in payments until the 
support arrives in the form of a letter or a friend. Needless to say that such accumulation of 
debts at various ends of the counter also opens the door to considerable misuse. Frequent are 
the testimonies in Butembo and surroundings in which the support or money transferred 
through intermediaries eventually did not arrive… 
 
Notwithstanding these numerous difficulties in maintaining a living between distant life 
worlds, most displaced youngsters interviewed for this study actually preferred to stay in 
Butembo and surroundings, mostly because they find the urban environment offering more 
opportunities in terms of jobs and the socio-economic environment. Whereas no 
unconditional questions were asked regarding an eventual return to the “home” region 
(also because this question can easily be misinterpreted especially if asked by a white 
foreign interviewer), the main motives for displaced youngsters to stay in Butembo were  
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the favourable social and economic environment of the city (69 percent), and access to 
work and resources (24 percent).  
 
Finally, such cyclical migration patterns also translate into discussions about what exactly it 
means to have a home or to be at home for displaced urban youngsters. In Swahili, these are 
two different terms, which are respectively indicated with the word nyumba (house) and 
kwango (being home, or ‘chez soi’ in French). Whereas large agreement appears to exist 
between young IDP’s over the necessity to be able to cover one’s needs and not depend on 
others (“ne pas être sous tutelle”) – the most important asset for this being to have a stable job 
(kazi) – a gendered dimension adds itself to the discussion, with male youth emphasizing the 
need to buy a proper plot of land (‘une parcelle’) to build a house and raise a family
15 and 
girls emphasizing the need to find a good environment, where one could develop one’s 
qualities and raise a family eventually. According to one female participant:  
 
“I think what is best, what is good, is to stay there where you can find a living, with 
little difference between remaining here at home, to go somewhere else, or to go back to 
your family to do nothing. It is good to stay here if you have something on your hands. 
(...): if you find a living, regardless the environment, this suits you better (“cela arrange 
mieux”).” 
 
Urban life worlds 
 
The main focus of this study has been on professional occupations of displaced adolescents in 
the urban economy of Butembo though – which commonly is characterized as “informal” 
(Mirembe, 2002) and a potential safety net for the poor (Cooper, 2002; Goodhand, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the appeal of such urban occupations and their associated lifestyles, the 
survey among young adolescents occupied in the city’s many informal jobs – which go from 
chart towers to gravel crushers to petty traders – nonetheless shows a complete different 
picture that appears to contradict these two starting positions. On the one hand, the classic 
understanding of this “informal” economy as a separate and small-scale alternative against 
predatory (state) intervention completely ignores the systematic connections that exist 
                                                 
15 According to one participant to a focus group discussion: “Kwango, there one directly makes an allusion to one’s plot (...). 
You can have a wife or not, but you're always kwango (...) In the first place, one’s first vision must be the plot [of land].” 
(Interview 21 September 2008)  
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between capitalist and non-capitalist as well as state and non-state registers and modes of 
market intervention in the given domain. On the other hand, it also denies the important 
power issues that are at stake in defining the access of these youngsters to decent jobs, which 
I will concentrate on in the following paragraphs. Following a brief discussion of the results 
of this survey, the paper will continue analyzing specifically this latter aspect of the urban 
labour market through a discussion of the notion of social capital in the given context and (in 
the following section) two biographical examples.  A general conclusion will try to bring 
some of the emerging issues together.  
 
The driving question behind the survey conducted for this paper was which occupations 
displaced youngsters in Butembo and Bunyuka (an adjacent rural periphery) were employed 
in, and what would be their desired job if for some reason these main occupations would 
become unavailable. These two settings were chosen partly for comparative reasons (foremost 
to note differences between urban and near-to-rural settings) and partly because of a broader 
interest in issues of embeddedness and security (for example to see if “stable” occupations in 
rural and urban settings resulted in less or more tolerance for violence). The survey gave a 
good outline of youngsters’ preferences in terms of jobs and access problems, which could 
also be diversified gender-wise. Expectedly, the bulk of respondents told that they were 
employed in agriculture: 27.5 and 70 percent in Butembo and Bunyuka respectively, while 
about one third (29.7) of people doing two or more jobs found an income in this sector (with a 
small difference ratio between town and country of 0.9). The remaining part of displaced 
youngsters in and around Butembo were employed either in petty commerce (14 and 11 
percent in Butembo and Bunyuka respectively), the transport sector (12 and 0.7 percent 
respectively), or as “teachers” (24 and 13 percent)
16. In addition, about 2.9 to 9.6 percent of 
peri-urban and urban youngsters were engaged in ‘bikakala’ or temporary jobs, while about 7 
to 15 percent saw it as a potential job in case they lost their current occupation(s). This 
differentiation already gives and indication of these youngsters’ professional adaptiveness, as 
most (52 percent) comes from a job in agriculture since their flight from their original rural 
homesteads (actually all but one come from a rural background).  
 
                                                 
16 This last category might be a misrepresentation, however, which can be due to the selection method of interviewees 
through diaspora and professional associations (which commonly host the more educated among the adolescents). Butembo 
does nonetheless offer a market for private education in the form of language and computer courses, which are much aspired 
to by youngsters trying to diversify their talents.  
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What arises from this modest survey is an ensemble of steady and less steady occupations that 
are considerably different between town and countryside as well as between gender roles. A 
general observation is that the countryside theoretically offers a more stable economic 
environment in terms of labour opportunities (with agriculture being the most important 
employer there), while urban youngsters find more difficulty in combining income from 
irregular occupations like petty commerce (e.g. selling small foodstuffs like bananas and 
fritters), towing around packages and driving taxis or offering services to the many 
commercial intermediaries that populate the urban “informal” economy. A considerable 
segment of displaced urban youth, for example, is forced to secure a daily income temporary 
jobs or what is locally called ‘bikakala’ – which literally means “through offer and demand”. 
In a way, this term represents the often harsh economic conditions people are faced with in 
the execution of these petty jobs, which can basically involve anything from digging toilets to 
crushing stones and carrying sand (usually done by men), to preparing fritters (‘beignets’), 
selling bananas and ‘aracque’ (an alcoholic maize drink) on the side of the road (mostly a 
women’s job) or to load trucks as a ‘bombeur’ and drive a ‘chukudu’ through Butembo’s 
dusty streets. Particularly this latter occupation seems to occupy young – especially male – 
immigrant labourers in the city. During our survey in Butembo and Bunyuka, around 7 
percent of interviewed youngsters (of which only one in Bunyuka) declared to practice this 
job while 6.5 percent saw it as a potential job in case they lost their current occupations
17.  
 
The hypothetical advantage of rural IDP’s in terms of stable livelihood opportunities 
immediately drops though if one considers their lack of access from a larger perspective of 
accessibility to alternative occupations, which has more to do with individual capacities to 
diversify livelihoods (Alinovi et al., 2008). Apart from agriculture, adolescents in rural 
environments really don’t have much possibility to engage in alternative employment: 
teaching disregarded, commerce and transport only account for about 12.5 percent of 
                                                 
17 A chukudu is an onomatopoeia for the wooden, non-motorized scooters which are used in eastern Congo for the transport 
of charcoal, jerry cans and wooden boxes, cabbages and other foodstuffs. Since transport infrastructure is so low, chukudus 
and bicycles have practically become the only affordable transport from Congo’s eastern border to the densely forested areas 
of Kivu, Maniema and Oriental province. As a result, it has become an attractive occupation for young and exclusively male 
drivers, who are prepared to travel several weeks to export palm oil, coltan and other valuable goods from the forest areas in 
return for commercial goods imported from Uganda and East Africa for a few dollars wage. Some analysts have even 
described it as a relief for peasant mothers who traditionally carry the family’s load on their bare heads (see Washington Post, 
29 March 2009). In the town of Butembo, a chukudu driver can earn up to $10 a day carrying goods across town, so the 
profession is consequently much aspired to by displaced youngsters looking to earn a living in the urban second economy.   
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countryside jobs. This constitutes a major problem, because many of the young displaced 
people are forced to engage in numerous jobs in order to reach a sustainable income: actually 
close to one third of the interviewed youth said they engaged in supplementary labour. The 
problem for rural adolescents is that these alternative jobs are usually found outside the 
“traditional” sphere of agriculture, mainly in petty commerce and transport: while close to one 
half (41.6 percent) of displaced youngsters engaged in a second job found an income in petty 
trade, only one third (29.7 percent) did so in agriculture (with a town-country difference ratio 
of 0.7 and 0.85 respectively). These diversifications point at an interesting socio-cultural 
transformation in youth occupations in and around Butembo, which gradually but steadily 
integrates more urbanized and “modern” lifestyles. Moreover, this diversification appears to 
have an important impact on youth ambitions: whereas less and less displaced youngsters 
imagine a life in agriculture (44.6 and 55.4 percent in Butembo and Bunyuka respectively, 
compared to an almost 100 percent occupation in agriculture prior to forced displacement), an 
increasing segment of adolescents on the countryside (65.2 percent) imagine themselves 
performing a job in the commercial sector at some point in the future. While it is probably 
premature to talk about fundamental shifts here, these aspirations do nonetheless confirm 
tendencies in other post-conflict areas where “particularly (…) young people (…) consider 
themselves to be urbanized and have no real desire to return to their rural origins.” (Jacobsen, 
Lautze and Osman, 2001: 84) 
 
A final element in youth occupations that attracts attention is the role of gender. In a 
straightforward manner, more girls seem to be engaged in the commercial sector than men. 
The difference rate is about 2 to 1 (both as a second and an imagined future job), and on the 
countryside it is even higher. This is interesting in terms of IDP’s backgrounds, as the 
majority of youngsters with a previous job in agriculture (55 percent), are girls. This 
demonstrates not only a greater adaptiveness of girls to the urban economy, but also their 
tendency to easily accept new and strident labour conditions. This tendency is also 
demonstrated in the differentiation of ‘bikakala’ jobs, in which girls engage equally or even 
more than boys. During focus group discussions, female urban dwellers regularly told they 
were towing charts and dragging sand just like boys, in addition to the housekeeping and 
other obligations they had to do for their host families. This could suggest a gradual shift in 




The downside of social capital 
 
An often disregarded dimension of displaced youth employment in post-conflict environments 
finally constitutes their usage of social (or political) capital. This notion, which has taken 
increasing prominence in livelihoods research (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005), builds on the 
classic deprivation argument that for development to take place, individual agents should 
employ the right dose of social networks in order to gain access to indispensable assets like 
jobs, land and so on. According Michael Woolcock (1998: 175): 
 
“[F]or development to proceed in poor communities, the initial benefits of intensive 
intra-community integration, such as they are, must give way over time to extensive 
extra-community linkages: too much or too little of either dimension at any given 
moment undermines economic advancement.” 
 
Woolcock uses the notion proposed some time ago by Mark Granovetter of coupling and 
decoupling. This notion uses the analysis of non-communal ties to explain the different ways 
in which communities and individuals organize for common goals. But instead of the classical 
reference to culture and personality (inspired by the modernization approach), Granovetter 
suggests a more structural analytical tool to explain why some networks of individuals are 
more likely to be successful in the mobilization of their social capital (coupling), and why 
others are not (Granovetter, 1973). He calls this the “strength of weak social ties”, which 
basically means that the transitivity of knowledge and economic opportunities is dependent on 
the bridging ties one develops with people outside immediate social circles. In the words of 
one male youngster in one of Butembo’s rural peripheries: “[h]ere to get a job, you must have 
acquaintances. As we do not have those, we do not find work.” (Interview, 22 September 
2008) 
 
More than such bridging social ties, what seems to occupy Butembo’s displaced youngsters in 
their quest for a sustainable living seems to be their lack of linkages to powerful economic 
operators in town, whom also happen to be the main providers of their most needed asset: 
labour. As was shortly explained in the introduction, Butembo’s economy continues to be 
organized around a closed circle of traders and employers who effectuate a strong control 
over both transport networks and the commercial commodity chain, which impedes a flexible 
entry of workers. The fact that most of these businesses are organized on a family basis makes  
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it very difficult for outsiders to gain a job in this “second” economy – especially since the first 
one (administration and services) has collapsed time ago under a staggering Mobutu regime. 
A recurrent definition of this oligopolistic economic organisation by displaced youth, is that 
of ‘tribalisme’ (tribalism). According to one male adolescent from Mangina interviewed 
during a group discussion: 
 
“What I have observed here is that there is a lot of tribalism, or in other words [the need 
for] acquaintances.” (Interview, 21 September 2008) 
 
Other displaced youngsters use the term stranger (Swahili: wakujakuja) to describe their 
social condition in Butembo (interviews 21-22 September 2008).  This double notion of 
being a stranger in a “tribal” environment is interesting from a social ethnographic 
viewpoint, because it evokes the construction of a social urban space in which the entry of 
“marginal” subjects (i.e. those coming from outside and thus have no direct attachments to 
the city’s political economy) is highly regulated and confined by a closed community of 
“autochthonous” Butembo citizens – who are by no means all important entrepreneurs. 
This increasing commoditization of social relations appears to have given rise to a new 
differentiation between Bubolais (the inhabitants of Butembo) and “strangers” that is not 
purely based on ethic terms but follows a more commercial logic
18. In this sense, the 
current study connects with other observations made by a social anthropologist in the 
region who talks about a “caul” or membrane that captures would-be Butembo inhabitants 
in a discursive net. As she says, immigrants from other parts of the Congo (…) regularly 
complain they face problems integrating in Butembo’s society. They also deplore that after 
having lived in the city for a while, “one becomes like them”, which partly refers to the 
inhabitants’ assumed lack of sociability.  Being very much aware of the closed character of 
the city and of the particular atmosphere that lingers inside its limits, such observations 
force us to reflect more deeply about the (spatial, social) “rendition” of the city and its 
reproduction of social life (Geenen, 2010: 1-2).  At the same time, it makes it interesting to 
untangle what Honwana and De Boeck call the “tactical agency” of African displaced 
youngsters in such closed social environments, which also forms an expression of their 
                                                 
18 One distinguishing linguistic marker to distinguish between Bubolais  and other Nande for example is the particular 
Swahili vernacular people use in daily interaction, which is usually mixed with Lingala and Sudanic languages if they come 
from Beni and Ituri. This mixture can be related to the more “cosmopolitan” character of these northern territories, where the 
influence of administration and cross-border exchange has “polluted” the original Nande image (see also Geenen, 2010).  
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political consciousness as actors and participants in a constructed social space (Honwana 
and De Boeck, 2005). Building on Woolcock, there arises a need to expand the limited 
usage of the term “social capital” to explain why some people are able to construct a 
sustainable livelihood in a given time and space, and others are not. In order to overcome 
problems of vulnerability, people simultaneously need to assemble the range of contacts, 
capabilities and resources to take advantage of available opportunities
19. As the two 
biographical examples in the following paragraphs indicate, quite different realities can 
emerge from this ensuing dialectic between livelihood options and social networks. I will 
specifically evoke the testimonies of a former militia commander and a pit delver in 
Butembo – in part also to connect the life worlds of two youngsters that theoretically 
represent each others opposites (i.e. as violent and non-violent youth). A short conclusion 
will bring these two experiences together from a larger, viewpoint of sustainable 




The story of Rafale offers a good documentation of the “veil” that surrounds Butembo’s 
labour market and which neatly divides insiders from outsiders by form of an inclusionary 
exclusion (Agamben, 1995). I originally met Rafale in Furu, a neighbourhood on the 
northern outskirts of Butembo that originally formed the labour settlement of the colonial 
mining company Minière des Grand Lacs (MGL), which in the 1920’s to late 1950’s 
practically “owned” one third of North Kivu’s territory (Raeymaekers, 2007). The 
neighbourhood forms a vivid expression of the ambivalent relationship of Butembo with its 
immigrant reality, since it historically served as the home for the steady flow of workers 
and truck drivers that used to be employed in the mines as slaves. Since MGL closed its 
activities in the early 1960s, the neighbourhood gradually gathered a name as ‘bidonville’ 
and a notorious nest of crime and disruption. At the same time, it also bursts with 
“parallel” authorities and forms of public protest that all seem to concentrate in the local 
‘Parlement’ – a semi-representative body that functions as a neighbourhood watchdog and 
                                                 
19 Some – Skandinavian – anthropologists have usefully tried to reintroduce this notion of capabilities using Ralf 
Dahrendorf’s proposition of life chances, which consist of both options and nexuses (or ligatures); whereas options represent 
the variety of possibilities for an individual or household (similar to livelihood assets), nexuses are the social networks 
through which such options acquire meaning and realization (see for example Utas, 2003; Akesson, 2004; Vigh, 2006; 
Bjarnesen, 2009).  
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speakers’ corner under the cover of a UNHCR sheeting. Furu thus appears as a rather 
typical example of the frontier status peripheral urban areas have acquired in African cities, 
and which are productive of a daily mixture of protest and negotiation, social banditry and 
“parallel” institutions that serve both as a buffer and an accommodation against dominant 
registers of rule (Wacquant, 1997). Interesting for the use of this paper is the ample use of 
the category “youth” in the given context, a reference that seems to be associated more 
with a particular social condition (particularly of being ‘chomeurs’, or unemployed) than 
with a specific age group. The frequent participants in this local ‘Parlement’ use the 
terminology of youth (“jeunes du quartier”, “jeunes du milieu”) to indicate their position 
marginal subjects and social outcasts.   
 
After having frequented the Furu Parliamant for some time, its president introduced me to 
Rafale during a field trip in September 2008. We met in Rafale’s home in Furu, a little shack 
where he sat together with a group of friends, all former Mayi Mayi fighters that had deserted 
from the bush. He immediately explained to me that he found life in Butembo “un peu 
difficile” with regard to the bush. The pressing problem that seemed to touch all his 
companions was that they could neither claim the benefits of either world: whereas his former 
Mayi Mayi companions in the bush now treated him as a traitor and were on the lookout for 
him, he also found it impossible to integrate in his new, urban environment. During the time 
of the interview he was 21 years old. The only chance for survival upon his arrival in 
Butembo was to work as an apprentice in a furniture shop where he used to come as a child. 
As he explains:  
 
“It is only now that I learn how to work, because I went to the bush as a child and was 
only trained to kill the enemy. But once I returned now that’s how I have to adapt to 
life.”  
 
Rafale’s tenuous social condition became rapidly clear once he discovered that he had to pay 
his employer in order to become his apprentice. Besides this expensive entry ticket, the 
financial gains of his new job also proved insufficient as his boss was paying him badly. For a 
small chair of 100 CFR, he had to pay his boss 50 CFR back for the use of material and 
working space. But what drove him increasingly mad was the continuous climate of distrust, 
innuendo and suspicion with which his boss and fellow companions bestowed him on a daily 
basis. Every time he lent some money to fellow apprentices, or asked his boss for an advance  
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payment, his personal history as a Mayi Mayi fighter descended upon him like an ugly 
phantom which denied him his claim to a righteous share of Butembo’s wealth. This basically 
reduced Rafale to a life in the shadows, as every intimacy, every reference to his personal 
experience could potentially be used against him – notwithstanding the contribution he and 
his fellow brothers-in-arms made to the “liberation” of the city from external enemies
20. On a 
larger scale, therefore, the condition of Rafale illustrates quite sharply the association of 
“displaced” migrant youth with the political economy of urban markets, which also serves as 
a channel to legitimate certain modes of capital accumulation and distribution of resources to 
the included/excluded. More specifically, it illustrates the progressive commoditisation of 
social relations according to a closed and inward-looking logic which Theodore Trefon 
referred to earlier as “despair solidarity”. According to Trefon, this consists of a pragmatic 
system of economic exchange based on a tit-for-tat, give and take normativity: 
 
“The collective social values and practices characteristic of rural life in Congo have 
given way to the demands and contradictions of a market economy in which the 
individual is central. Attitudes and behaviours have evolved due to the degree of crisis 
and specifically the difficulties in finding cash-earning employment. Always looking for 
new ways to cope, poverty is psychologically transformed into ‘despair solidarity’. 
While the Congolese are able to willing to extend psychological support, financial and 





From a broader viewpoint, these transformations of social solidarity patterns in a post-war 
Congolese city force us to actively re-think the nature of market conditions in the aftermath of 
war – also because the everyday experience of so-called violent and non-violent youth does 
not seem all that different. Rather, it dresses a picture of post-war society in which the claim 
of exclusive citizenship – formerly expressed in terms of ethnicity, tribe or even race – has 
gradually made place for an economic governmentality in which exclusion is enforced 
through the agency of the market. This tendency becomes evident in the testimony of 
                                                 
20 A detailed analysis of these Mayi Mayi militias and their relation to town goes beyond the scope of this paper. For more 
details, see Jourdan (2010).   
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Mumbere, a Munande from the territory of Beni who arrived in Butembo around October 
2002 as a result of the operation ‘Effacer le Tableau’ (cf. supra). Mumbere remembers 
loosing his brothers, sisters and parents on the way to Butembo, where he stayed for several 
months trying to find a safe place to live. Initially, he stayed in a temporary settlement close 
to the airport at Rwenda, but when Bemba’s troops clashed there with local Mayi Mayi 
militias, he had to escape again. He remembers a long period wandering around town without 
having a proper residence. At a certain point, ‘un bon Samaritain’ offered him a place to sleep, 
but after three weeks he was kicked out again. That was the beginning of a very difficult 
period for Mumbere: as he was a visitor (‘un visiteur’) and nobody knew who he was or 
where he came from, he was forced to rent a bed for the night, a little shack that cost him $3 a 
month:  
 
“There at least I knew they couldn’t chase me, there I could each time go to sleep.”  
 
The next problem for Mumbere was now to earn his $3 to pay for his room. So he started 
looking around and found a job as a toilet digger: 
 
“It was a very hard job, but I continued since it helped me anyway to pay my rent. I 
found that I tired too much; it was as if I had fire in my body. I thought I could even die 
before reaching my age. But here in Butembo, since there is all this tribalism I have 





This study has tried to give a modest indication of what it means to be young, displaced and 
looking for a job in a war-affected town of the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a tentative 
conclusion, I have distilled two distinct trends from this brief encounter with Butembo’s 
immigrant youth. The first of these is that displaced youngsters in Butembo seem to follow 
the general trend of other African countries emerging from protracted conflict, which involves 
a steady urbanization as well as a youth’s refusal of “traditional” agricultural lifestyles. The 
combined consequences of war, rural underdevelopment and global marginalization appear to 
be rapidly fostering a societal shift in the given context towards urban and more “modern” 
lifestyles. Indicatively, this observation suggests that Richards and Chauveau are only partly  
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right when they state that the establishment of stable rural attachments provides a sine-qua 
non for conflict-affected youth to resolve their enforced status of hyper mobility and social 
exclusion. Besides the many problems that have arisen – and continue to arise – with regard to 
access to land and political participation of rural youth in eastern Congo (and which are amply 
discussed elsewhere), the brief encounter I had with displaced youngsters in the Butembo area 
suggests their determination to definitively leave their original rural backgrounds and 
construct a life that sits between agricultural and urban sources of income. When looking at 
their ambitions, however, the tendency is definitely towards urban professions and lifestyles: 
a large majority of interviewed youth (85 percent) don’t want to maintain agriculture as a 
primary occupation but instead envisages a future in the city in for example commerce and 
services (about 40 percent), intellectual labour (17 percent), artisan occupations (10 percent), 
or administrative jobs (10 percent). Any social programme that envisages helping displaced 
youth to develop their capacities should involve awareness about this quest for a socio-
economic climate attached to the imagery of city life.  
 
The second conclusion of this study is that youth access to decent jobs is severely blocked, 
not so much by their social capital and lack of stable attachments but rather by a murderous 
market equilibrium. As was explained in the beginning of this study, northeast Congo’s 
regional market continues to be manipulated by a closed circle of oligopolist traders, some of 
whom have a vested interest in conflict economies, and this obviously has a pernicious effect 
on migrating youth. With some care, one could maintain that Butembo’s configuration of 
interests and rule is in no way different to the autochthonous-immigrant divides that have 
been noticed in other ‘post’-conflict settings such as the more southern parts of North Kivu or 
even Ivory Coast, where access to land and other important livelihoods assets are 
encapsulated by a closed group of gatekeepers. In this sense, the present study connects with 
more critical voices that have been raised recently in livelihoods research and which ask for 
greater attention to dialectics of power (for example De Haan en Zoomers, 2005; Prowse, 
2008). A more sociological perspective can help illuminate how such power dynamics are not 
only informed by the immediacy of economic opportunity but also by imageries tied to 
people’s ambitions in the social world. On the one hand, this illustrates how youth 
displacement continues to be informed by many “detours”, unwilling dispositions and 
trajectories (Vigh, 2006: 14). On the other hand, it shows that the ways in which such social 
navigation is being directed is also highly informed by explicitly political notions of 
legitimate social action which connects socio-economic access/distress to local constructions  
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of autochthony and social inclusion/exclusion. This is probably why it remains important 
evoking the potentiality of young – and especially displaced young – people to carve out a 
sustainable livelihood in a war-affected environment not as conflict risks and social outcasts 
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